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pAbstract: This paper investigates the relationship between the magnitude of
automatic stabilizers in the tax and transfer systems of 19 EU countries and the US,
and discretionary fiscal stimulus packages passed by these countries during the
recent economic crisis. In particular, we ask whether countries with larger automatic
stabilizers have enacted smaller discretionary fiscal stimulus programs. Our results
support this hypothesis. Our findings also suggest that social transfers, in particular
the rather generous systems of unemployment insurance in Europe, play a key role
for the stabilization of disposable incomes and explain a large part of the difference
in automatic stabilizers between Europe and the US.
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1 Introduction
In the debate on policy responses to the recent crisis, some countries have been criti-
cized for being reluctant to enact fiscal stimulus programs in order to stabilize de-
mand, in particular Germany. One reaction to this criticism was to point to the fact
that automatic stabilizers in Germany are more important than in other countries, so
that less discretionary action is required. This raises the general question of whether
countries with weaker automatic stabilizers have taken more discretionary fiscal policy
action to compensate for this.
The recent recession triggered by the financial crisis has had a severe impact on
incomes and employment around the world and especially in Europe (OECD 2012).
While it is uncontroversial that both the magnitude of the economic contraction dur-
ing the crisis and its effects on labor markets were attenuated considerably by the work
of automatic and discretionary stabilization, a large part of the resulting policy debate
has focused on the size of discretionary fiscal policy plans and on rescue packages for
banks. Much less attention has been devoted to the workings of automatic stabilizers.
Automatic stabilizers are usually defined as those elements of fiscal policy which
reduce tax burdens and increase public spending without discretionary government ac-
tion. In particular, automatic stabilizers provide income replacement immediately when
unemployment starts to rise. During the recent crisis, the tax and benefit system has
acted as an automatic stabilizer on both the revenue as well as the expenditure side of
the general government budget. Due to differences related to the structure and finan-
cing of the tax benefit system, the degree of automatic stabilization was bound to vary
across countries.2012 Dolls et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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ance for households and hence in stabilizing demand and output. The automatic action
of tax-transfer policies was accompanied in most countries by discretionary action in
the field of tax, social and labor market policy. This action included a broad range of
measures such as (payroll) tax cuts, employment incentives, activation policies, higher
benefits and increased transfers to low-income households. Therefore, especially for
the recent crisis, it is important to assess the contribution of automatic stabilizers to
the overall fiscal expansion and to compare their magnitude across countries. Under-
standing the relationship between automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy is
crucial, because countries with larger automatic stabilizers have to rely less on discre-
tionary fiscal stimulus packages, other things being equal. As final data on fiscal stimu-
lus packages during the recent economic crisis are now available, it is possible to shed
light on this relationship. This is the purpose of this paper.
We build on former work (see Dolls et al. 2012) which investigates the magnitude of
automatic stabilizers inherent in the tax and transfer systems of 19 EU countries plus
the US1. We relate these estimates of automatic stabilizers to new information on dis-
cretionary fiscal stimuli. Our empirical analysis points to a robust negative relationship
between these two pillars of fiscal and social policy. This suggests that policy makers
may indeed have taken into consideration the strength of automatic stabilizers when
they decided how much to spend on discretionary fiscal policy packages in the crisis.
These results are interesting because they shed new light on the factors determining
the fiscal policy response of governments to the crisis. Our findings have important
implications for the ongoing policy debate about institutional reforms following the
sovereign debt crisis. While it is clear that balanced budgets need to be achieved in the
medium-run, it is important to take into account the impact of reforms on automatic
stabilizers. Also, our results support the argument that countries that have enacted
smaller stimulus programs were countries with more automatic stabilizers. Of course,
automatic stabilizers should not be the only determinant of discretionary programs.
Other factors like the initial budgetary position or the size of the shock in the country
under consideration have to be taken into account.
What is the contribution of this paper, relative to the existing literature? To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first who analyze this relationship for the recent eco-
nomic crisis with a direct measure for the magnitude of automatic stabilizers and up-
to-date data on fiscal stimulus packages. The (IMF 2009), using the average ratio of
revenue to GDP as an indirect measure for automatic stabilization, finds a negative re-
lationship between government size and the size of the discretionary fiscal impulse2.
Moreover, as their work was done at an early stage in the recession, they rely on projec-
tions for discretionary measures (see IMF (2009)). However, in (Dolls et al. 2012), we
show that simple macro measures such as the tax revenue to GDP ratio only partially
predict the amount of automatic stabilization. In a similar vein, the (OECD 2009) finds
an inverse relationship between the size of fiscal packages and automatic stabilizers,
but also uses projections for fiscal stimulus and a measure for automatic stabilization
which is conceptually not comparable to ours as it is based on the cyclical sensitivity of
the budget to the economic cycle (see Girouard and André 2005).
Two recent contributions investigate the cross-country variation in fiscal stimulus
during the crisis ((Bénétrix and Lane 2010) and (Aaizenman and Jinjarak 2010)) and
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fiscal space), but do not account for the amount of automatic stabilization. Interestingly
and in line with our hypothesis, (Auerbach 2009) points to the fact that automatic sta-
bilizers have been historically low in the pre-crisis years 2003-7 in the U.S. and con-
cludes that this low level of automatic stabilization is one potential explanation for
policy decisions with regard to discretionary fiscal policy during the recent economic
crisis in the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the conceptual
framework and the empirical approach. Section 3 presents the results for automatic stabi-
lizers and section 4 the relationship with discretionary fiscal policy. Section 5 concludes.2 Conceptual framework and empirical approach framework
2.1 Theoretical background
Economic stabilization is primarily associated with the ability of taxes and transfers to
stabilize income and in consequence consumption automatically in the face of eco-
nomic downturns. The stabilizing character of the tax and transfer system relies on a
simple mechanism: In the presence of a negative shock to income, taxes net of transfers
decline, so that the negative shock on disposable income is smaller than it would be in
the absence of the tax and transfer system. Several components of government budgets
are affected by the macroeconomic situation in ways that operate to smooth the busi-
ness cycle, with progressive income taxes and out-of-work benefits being the most
prominent example. Automatic stabilization might have effects not only on disposable
income but also on GDP itself. If in a recession, fewer taxes are collected and more
transfers are paid. This should support private incomes and damp adverse movements
in aggregate demand. We can expect this stabilizing property to be stronger if the tax
system is more progressive (van den Noord 2000).
The extent to which automatic stabilizers mitigate the impact of income shocks on
household demand essentially depends on two factors. Firstly, the tax and transfer system
determines the way in which a given shock to gross income translates into a change in dis-
posable income. For instance, in the presence of a proportional income tax with a tax rate
of 40%, a shock on gross income of one hundred Euros leads to a decline in disposable in-
come of 60 Euros. In this case, the tax absorbs 40% of the shock to gross income. A pro-
gressive tax, in turn, would have a stronger stabilizing effect. The second factor is the link
between current disposable income and current demand for goods and services. If the in-
come shock is perceived as transitory and current demand depends on some concept of
permanent income, and if households can borrow or use accumulated savings, their de-
mand will not change. In this case, the impact of automatic stabilizers on current demand
would be equal to zero. Things are different, though, if households were liquidity con-
strained. In this case, their current expenditures do depend on disposable income so that
automatic stabilizers play a role. However, in this paper, we will concentrate on the first
factor, the stabilization of disposable income aftershocks on gross income (see Dolls et al.
2012 for the stabilization of household demand).
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilization is the “normalized tax
change” used by (Auerbach and Feenberg 2000) which can be interpreted as “the tax sys-
tem’s built-in flexibility” (Pechman (1973; 1987)). Based on this idea, in (Dolls et al. 2012),
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come (defined as the sum of all incomes from market activities such as (self)-employment,
business and property income) YM translate into changes in disposable income (market
income minus taxes plus benefits) YD through changes in net tax payments G. We extend
the concept of normalized tax change to include (direct) taxes as well as transfers. We
take into account personal income taxes (at all government levels), social insurance con-
tributions as well as payroll taxes and transfers to private households such as out-of-work
benefits3. (Dolls et al. 2012) show that the income stabilization coefficient can be derived
from any general functional relationship between disposable income and market income.
The derivation can be either done on the macro or on the micro level. On the macro level,
it holds that the aggregate change in market income is transmitted via τ into an aggregate
change in disposable income. However, one problem for the computation with macro data
is that this data includes behavioral and general equilibrium effects as well as active fiscal
policy. Therefore, a measure of automatic stabilization based on macro data captures all
these effects. In order to single out the pure size of automatic stabilization, we compute τ
using arithmetic changes (Δ) in total disposable income (
P
iΔYi
D) and market income
(
P
iΔYi
M) based on household micro level information:
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Computations are done according to the tax benefit rules which were in force before
2008 in order to avoid an endogeneity problem resulting from policy responses after
the start of the crisis.
2.2 Microsimulation using TAXSIM and EUROMOD
We use microsimulation techniques to simulate taxes, benefits and disposable income
under different scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of households. Simula-
tion analysis allows conducting a controlled experiment by changing the parameters of
interest while holding everything else constant. In particular, we are able to investigate
the causal effects of different types of shocks on household disposable income and to
avoid endogeneity problems when identifying the counterfactual effects (see Bourguignon
and Spadaro (2006)). We can hence single out the role of automatic stabilization which is
not possible in an ex-post evaluation (or with macro data) as it is not possible to disen-
tangle the effects of automatic stabilizers, active fiscal and monetary policy and behav-
ioral responses like changes in labor supply or benefit take-up.
Simulations are carried out using TAXSIM - the NBER's model for calculating liabil-
ities under US Federal and State income tax laws from individual data - and EURO-
MOD, a static tax-benefit model for 19 EU countries, which was designed for
comparative analysis4. The models can simulate most direct taxes and benefits except
those based on previous contributions as this information is usually not available from
the cross-sectional survey data used as input datasets. Information on these instru-
ments is taken directly from the original data sources. Both models assume full benefit
take-up and tax compliance, focusing on the intended effects of tax-benefit systems.
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cially in countries where means-tested benefits are important (e.g., Ireland, UK), as
take-up rates are typically much lower than for insurance benefits. The main stages of
the simulations are the following. First, a representative micro-data sample and the
according, pre-crisis tax-benefit rules (as of January 1st, 2008) are read into the model.
Then for each tax and benefit instrument, the model constructs corresponding assess-
ment units, ascertains which are eligible for that instrument and determines the
amount of benefit or tax liability for each member of the unit. Finally, after all taxes
and benefits in question are simulated, disposable income is calculated.2.3 Scenarios
The existing literature on stabilization so far has concentrated on increases in earnings
or gross incomes to examine the stabilizing impact of tax benefit systems. In the light
of the recent economic crisis, there is more interest in a downturn scenario. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) stress that recessions following a financial crisis have particularly se-
vere effects on asset prices, output and unemployment. Therefore, we run two con-
trolled experiments of macro shocks to income and employment. The first is a
proportional decline in household gross income by 5% (income shock). This is the
usual way of modeling shocks in simulation studies analyzing automatic stabilizers.
However, economic downturns typically affect households asymmetrically, with some
households losing their jobs and suffering a sharp decline in income and other house-
holds being much less affected, as wages are usually rigid in the short term. We there-
fore consider a second, idiosyncratic macro shock where some households become
unemployed and therefore lose all their labor earnings (unemployment shock). In this
scenario, the unemployment rate increases such that total household income decreases
by 5% as well in order to make both scenarios as comparable as possible5.
Dolls et al. (2012) show that the two types of shocks and the resulting stabilization
coefficients can be interpreted along the lines of average effective marginal tax rates
(EMTR) for the whole tax benefit system at the intensive (proportional income shock)
or extensive (unemployment shock) margin (see, e.g., Immvervoll 2004). Our measures
of automatic stabilization differ from conventional EMTRs as we take into account in-
come and payroll taxes as well as social benefits. In addition, instead of averaging indi-
vidual EMTRs, the measure of automatic stabilization looks at the total change in
market and disposable incomes.
The increase of the unemployment rate is modeled through reweighting of our sam-
ples6. The weights of the unemployed are increased while those of the employed with
similar characteristics are decreased, i.e., in effect, a fraction of employed households is
made unemployed. With this reweighting approach we control for several individual
and household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unemployed. The
implicit assumption behind this approach is that the socio-demographic characteristics
of the unemployed remain constant7.3 Automatic stabilization
In this section, we report and discuss the most important results from (Dolls et al.
2012) which will be the input for the main analysis in the next section.
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includes 19 European countries which we treat as one single country (i.e. the “United
States of Europe”). All of them are EU Member States, which is why we refer to this
group as the EU, bearing in mind that some EU member countries are missing. We
also consider the countries of the Euro area and refer to this group as 'Euro'. Figure 1
summarizes the results of our baseline simulation, which focuses on the income
tax, social insurance contributions (or payroll taxes) paid by employees and bene-
fits. Consider first the income shock. Approximately 38% of such a shock would
be absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the EU (and Euroland). For the US, we
find a slightly lower value of 32%. This difference of just six percentage points is
surprising in so far as automatic stabilizers in Europe are usually considered to
be drastically higher than in the US8. Our results qualify this view to a certain
degree; at least as far as proportional income shocks are concerned. Figure 1
shows that taxes and social insurance contributions are the dominating factors
which drive τ in case of a uniform income shock. Benefits are of minor import-
ance in this scenario.
In the case of the unemployment shock, the difference between the EU and the US is
larger. EU automatic stabilizers now absorb 47% of the shock (49% in the Euro zone)
whereas the stabilization effect in the US is only 34%. This difference can be explained
with the importance of out-of-work benefits which account for a large part of
stabilization in Europe in this scenario. Benefits alone absorb 19% of the shock in
Europe compared to just 7% in the US9.3.1 Cross-country differences
The results for the stabilization coefficient vary considerably across countries, as can be
seen from Figure 2. In the case of the income shock, we find the highest stabilization
coefficient for Denmark, where automatic stabilizers cushion 56% of the shock. BelgiumFigure 1 Decomposition of stabilization coefficient for both scenarios – US vs. EU.
Figure 2 Decomposition of income stabilization coefficient for both scenarios –Country Ranking.
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lowest values are found for Estonia (25%), Spain (28%) and Greece (29%). With the ex-
ception of France, taxes seem to have a stronger stabilizing role than social security
contributions.
In case of the unemployment shock, the stabilization coefficients are larger for
the majority of countries. Again, the highest value emerges for Denmark (82%), fol-
lowed by Sweden (68%), Germany (62%), Belgium (61%) and Luxembourg (59%).
The relatively low value of stabilization from (unemployment) benefits in Finland
compared to its neighboring Nordic countries might be surprising at a first glance
but can be explained with the fact that Finland has the least generous unemploy-
ment benefits of the Nordic countries (see Aaberge et al. (2000)). Hungary (47%)
is now at the EU average due to the relatively low level of unemployment benefits.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are some countries with values below the
US level of 34%. These include Estonia (23%), Italy (31%), and, to a lesser extent,
Poland (33%).
When looking only at the personal income tax, it is surprising that the values for the
US (federal and state level income tax combined) are higher than the EU average. To
some extent, this qualifies the widespread view that tax progressivity is higher in Europe
(e.g., Alesina and Glaeser (2004) or Piketty and Saez (2007)). Of course, this can be
partly explained by the considerable heterogeneity within Europe. But still, only a few
countries like Belgium, Germany and the Nordic countries have higher contributions of
stabilization coming from the personal income tax.
It is a striking feature of our results that automatic stabilizers differ significantly
within Europe. In particular, automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European
countries are much weaker than in the rest of Europe. One factor contributing to this
is that government size is often positively correlated with per capita incomes, at least in
Europe. The stabilization of disposable incomes will therefore be higher in high income
countries, just as a side effect of a larger public sector.
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tween our measure of automatic stabilization and effective average tax rates – which is
not surprising given its definition.
The relationship between effective average tax rates and the stabilization coefficient
for the unemployment shock is weaker as shown in Figure 4. The reason is that the lat-
ter depends to a large extent on the generosity of unemployment benefits.4 Automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy during the crisis
During the crisis, policy-makers implemented a number of discretionary reforms to so-
cial protection systems. In most countries, social protection was increased with a num-
ber of measures targeted at families with children and households exposed to poverty
risks. Other measures were aimed at maintaining or facilitating (re)employment. An-
other set of policies was geared at encouraging flexible working time, thus enhancing
internal flexibility, and more in general at cutting labor costs.
We use up-to-date data on fiscal stimulus packages from the (IMF 2012) and the
(OECD 2010) which slightly differ in terms of measurement of active fiscal policy. Con-
ceptually, fiscal policy can be measured by changes in the actual budget balance which
can be split up into a cyclical and a structural component. The total change in the
budget balance reflects the effect of both automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal
policy and does not allow us to compare the two pillars of fiscal policy see e.g. (Fatás
and Mihov 2009).
In a first step, we consider the relationship between the cumulative change in the
cyclical government balance 2009-11 in per cent of 2008 GDP and our measure for
automatic stabilizers. Figures 5 and 6 reveal a significant negative relationship between
the stabilization coefficient and changes in the cyclical balance. That is, the higher the
built-in automatic stabilizers, the larger the cyclical deficit during the crisis. However,AT
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Figure 3 EATR and automatic stabilizers. Source: Own calculations based on (EUROMOD and TAXSIM
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Figure 4 EATR and automatic stabilizers (unemployment shock). Source: Own calculations based on
(EUROMOD and TAXSIM and Immervoll 2004).
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cal policy.
Therefore, in the next step, we look at the structural balance in order to analyze the re-
lationship between automatic and discretionary policies. We calculate the change in the
structural balance between the pre-crisis year 2007 and the average for the years 2008-11
in order to focus on the endogenous response of fiscal policy to the economic crisis10.
Higher values of this measure of active fiscal policy indicate larger fiscal packages. We also
distinguish discretionary fiscal policies in the years 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 given thatAT
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Figure 5 Change in cyclical balance and automatic stabilizers. Source: Own calculations based on
(EUROMOD and TAXSIM and OECD 2010).
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Figure 6 Change in cyclical balance and automatic stabilizers (unemployment shock). Source: Own
calculations based on (EUROMOD and TAXSIM and OECD 2010).
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2010) the size of the fiscal packages is determined as the deviation of fiscal balances com-
pared with a "no-crisis-related-action scenario". Moreover, detailed information on the
composition of fiscal packages is provided. It is evident from both data sources that the
cross-country variation in the size of fiscal stimulus measures is substantial. According to
(OECD 2010) the U.S. have passed the largest fiscal package in our sample of countries
amounting to 5.6% of GDP in 2008 with tax and spending measures being comparable in
size (3.2% total tax measures vs. 2.4% spending measures)11.
Figures 7 and 8 (data from IMF 2012) present results for the relationship between
the change in the general government structural balance from 2007 to 2008-11 and
automatic stabilizers. These graphs indicate that countries with larger automatic stabili-
zers have passed smaller fiscal stimulus packages in the economic crisis.
As discretionary fiscal policy has varied enormously over the 2008-11 period, moving
from highly expansionary to highly contractionary in some countries, we conduct the
analysis separately for discretionary measures passed in 2008-09 (Figures 9a and 10a)
and 2010-11 (Figures 9b and 10b).
While the negative correlation is visible for both sub-periods, it is much stronger
(and hence also stronger than for the 2008-2011 average) for the first part of the crisis.
Largest shifts from expansionary to contractionary fiscal policies can be observed for
countries such as Greece or Ireland which received financial support from the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) under the condition of severe fiscal adjust-
ment programs. In other countries fiscal policy was not expansionary (Austria, Germany,
Italy) or contractionary (Hungary) even in the 2008-2009 period. Austerity measures re-
cently implemented in many EU countries, in particular in Spain, Portugal or the UK, are
only partly reflected in Figure 9b as they will persist to 2012 and beyond.
The negative correlation between automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy in
2008-2009 is confirmed when estimating multivariate regression equations controlling for
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Figure 7 Change in structural balance (08-11) and automatic stabilizers. Source: Own calculations
based on (EUROMOD and TAXSIM and IMF 2012).
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ratio, two measures of fiscal space as suggested by (Aaizenman and Jinjarak 2010)12, the
level of trade openness (defined as the ratio of imports and exports relative to GDP) and
GDP per capita13. The first four regressors control for the budgetary situation in those
countries under consideration before the start of the economic crisis14, trade openness
and GDP per capita for other potentially important determinants of discretionary fiscal
policy. All these controls are standard in this context (see, e.g. Bénétrix and Lane (2010)).
All regressors are pre-determined since they are measured in the pre-crisis year 2007AT
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Figure 8 Change in structural balance and automatic stabilizers (unempl. shock). Source: Own
calculations based on (EUROMOD and TAXSIM and IMF 2012).
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(b) 2010-11 
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Figure 9 Change in structural balance and automatic stabilizer. Source: Own calculations based on
(EUROMOD and TAXSIM and IMF 2012).
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2006.
The results are shown in Table 1. When interpreting them, it should be taken
into account that they are based on 19 observations only. The coefficient for the
size of automatic stabilizers (income stabilization coefficient) is significant in all
specifications. The R2 indicates that the best fit is achieved with additional regres-
sors controlling for the fiscal position before the start of the crisis. Our results
thus confirm that countries whose fiscal position was weak before the economic
crisis unfolded were constrained in their ability to react with discretionary fiscal
stimulus (Romer 2012).
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(b) 2010-11 
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Figure 10 Change in structural balance and automatic stabilizers (unempl. shock). Source: Own
calculations based on (EUROMOD and TAXSIM and IMF 2012).
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shock as dependent variable are presented in Table 2. The qualitative results are similar
to those shown in Table 1 for the income shock.
Table 1 Regression on change in structural balance – income stabilization income shock
Dependent variable: Change in str. balance 2007 to 2008-09
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Income stabilization coefficient
income shock
-0.214*** -0.195*** -0.201*** -0.200*** -0.234*** -0.216*** -0.205**
(0.042) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.057) (0.042)
Net interest payments -0.738***
(0.234)
Debt / GDP -0.040***
(0.013)
Fiscal Space 1 -0.945**
(0.356)
Fiscal Space 2 -8.666*
(4.605)
Openness 0.001
(0.011)
GDP per capita 0.012
(0.009)
Constant 10.148*** 11.119*** 12.166*** 11.909*** 11.613*** 10.191*** 8.279***
(1.527) (1.294) (1.407) (1.469) (1.623) (1.725) (2.048)
Observations 19 18 19 19 19 19 19
R2 0.600 0.761 0.749 0.723 0.673 0.600 0.640
Source: Data on change in structural balance from (IMF 2012). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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nated discretionary measures was that countries could limit the size of their programs at
the expense of countries with more generous fiscal policy responses. The central factor be-
hind this hypothesis is the degree of openness of an economy. The more open an economy
is, i.e. the stronger the economic ties with other countries are, the more likely it is that a
country gains from other countries’ fiscal stimulus packages or, conversely, the more likely
it is that own fiscal stimulus measures spill over to other countries. Hence, the idea behind
this argument is that some countries might show a free-rider behavior and profit from
spill-over effects of discretionary measures15. We find only weak evidence for this hypoth-
esis. While the correlation between discretionary measures passed in 2008-2009 and trade
openness is negative which is confirmed when we estimate a univariate regression between
these two16 , the coefficient on openness becomes insignificant once our measure for auto-
matic stabilization is included as can be seen in column (6) of Table 1. This is due to the
fact that the correlation between openness and automatic stabilization is positive. All in all,
our results suggest that policymakers did take into account the forces of automatic stabili-
zers when designing active fiscal policy measures to tackle the recent economic crisis.5 Conclusions and policy implications
Fiscal policy has been a central tool for governments to counteract economic stagna-
tion in the recent crisis, both in terms of automatic stabilization as well as discretionary
fiscal policy. Many papers have investigated the effectiveness of stabilization policies in
Table 2 Regression on change in structural balance – income stabilization unempl shock
Dependent variable: Change in str. balance 2007 to 2008-09
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Income stabilization coefficient
unempl. shock
−0.089*** −0.096*** −0.103*** −0.096*** −0.106*** −0.071* −0.083**
(0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.029) (0.035) (0.029)
Net interest payments −1.057***
(0.259)
Debt / GDP −0.060***
(0.014)
Fiscal Space 1 −1.371***
(0.408)
Fiscal Space 2 −9.687
(6.149)
Openness −0.011
(0.012)
GDP per capita 0.012
(0.012)
Constant 6.268*** 8.893*** 10.529*** 9.824*** 7.783*** 6.147*** 4.556*
(1.228) (1.107) (1.336) (1.434) (1.520) (1.239) (2.195)
Observations 19 18 19 19 19 19 19
R2 0.368 0.700 0.700 0.630 0.453 0.401 0.401
Source: Data on change in structural balance from (IMF 2012). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
Dolls et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012, 1:4 Page 15 of 19
http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/4the recent recession, but little is known on the relationship between the two compo-
nents of fiscal policy. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap.
Using up-to-date data on discretionary fiscal policy and two measures of automatic
stabilization - income stabilization coefficients resulting from an income and an un-
employment shock scenario - we find that countries with larger automatic stabilizers
tended to enact smaller fiscal stimulus packages in the recent economic crisis. The US, for
example, a country with rather small automatic stabilizers - both in an international per-
spective as well as in its own historical context - was the country with the largest fiscal
stimulus package amounting to 5.6% of GDP. Given the low automatic stabilizers, however,
the total effect of fiscal policy in the US has been more moderate than the size of the dis-
cretionary program might suggest. Of course, there are other determinants of discretionary
fiscal policy. We find that the fiscal position of each country before the start of the crisis
was a further important determinant for the size of discretionary fiscal stimulus packages.
Our results suggest that social protection systems, and in particular out-of-work bene-
fits, play a key role for the stabilization of disposable incomes and explain a large part of
the difference in automatic stabilizers between Europe and the US. This is confirmed by
the decomposition of stabilization effects in our analysis. In the case of the unemployment
shocks, benefits alone absorb 19% of the shock in Europe compared to just 7% in the US,
whereas the stabilizing effect of income taxes (taking into account state taxes in the US as
well) is similar. Note, however, that considerable heterogeneity exists within Europe.
Automatic stabilizers have the major advantage of providing income replacement
immediately, i.e. when unemployment starts to rise and incomes fall. While means-
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EU Member States, unemployment insurance systems are more exclusive as they do
not protect all types of workers equally. As the extent of unemployment risks and
the ‘quality’ of social protection provided to different socio-economic groups does
not coincide, one can argue that in general those most affected are the least pro-
tected. Here, a discretionary expansion of benefit generosity or easing access to
benefits can play a substantial role in reaction to crises. However, discretionary
changes to benefit systems or the creation of new benefits may take some time and
may be more difficult to administer and deliver, in particular if new groups are to
be integrated or new benefits created – or if fiscal restrictions are considered.
Therefore, it might be worth to redesign active and passive labor market policies in
such a way that they automatically respond to cyclical variations as for instance the
extended unemployment insurance in Canada and the US. How to optimally design
such instruments in an automatic way provides an interesting avenue for future
research.
A limitation of our analysis is that we only consider a rather small sample of European
countries as well as the US. It would be interesting to extend this analysis also to develop-
ing countries.Endnotes
1Previous research on automatic stabilization has mainly relied on macro data
(e.g. Girouard and André (2005)). Exceptions based on micro data are (Auerbach and
Feenberg 2000) and (Knieser and Ziliak 2002a, b) for the US and (Mabbett and Schelkle
2007) for the EU-15. As it is common in this literature, we have to assume the full take-
up of social benefits for our simulations which might overestimate the automatic stabilizer
measures in countries where non-take-up is important. In addition, we abstract from any
(potential) behavioral responses as we are interested in separating the automatic response
from discretionary and general equilibrium effects.
2See (Galí 1994), (Fatás and Mihov 2001) or (Debrun et al. 2008) for the positive as-
sociation between government size and automatic stabilizers and their dampening ef-
fect on GDP volatility.
3We abstract from other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes. For an analysis
of automatic stabilizers in the corporate tax system, see (Devereux and Fuest 2009) and
(Buettner and Fuest 2010).
4For more information on TAXSIM see (Feenberg and Coutts 1993) or visit http://
www.nber.org/taxsim/. For further information on EUROMOD see (Sutherland 2001,
2007). There are also country reports available with detailed information on the input
data, the modeling and validation of each tax benefit system and the underlying data,
see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. The tax-benefit systems included in
the model have been validated against aggregated administrative statistics in order to
make sure they reflect the initial baseline conditions in each country as well as national
tax-benefit models (where available), and the robustness checked through numerous
applications (see e.g. Bargain (2006)).
5Our scenarios can be seen as a conservative estimate of the expected impact of the
recent crisis (see Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)) for effects of previous crises). The
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/4(qualitative) results are robust with respect to different sizes of the shocks. The results
for the unemployment shock do not change much when we model it as an increase of
the unemployment rate by 5 percentage points for each country. It would be further
possible to derive more complicated scenarios with different shocks on different in-
come sources or a combination of income and unemployment shock. However, this
would only have an impact on the distribution of changes which are not relevant in the
analysis of this paper. Therefore, we focus on these two simple scenarios in order to
make our analysis as simple as possible. One should note, though, that our analysis is
not a forecasting exercise. We do not aim at quantifying the exact effects of the recent
economic crisis but of stylized scenarios in order to explore the build-in automatic sta-
bilizers of existing pre-crisis tax-benefit systems. Conducting an ex-post analysis would
include discretionary government reactions and behavioral responses (see, e.g., Aaberge
et al. (2000) for an empirical ex-post analysis of a previous crisis in the Nordic coun-
tries) and we would not be able to identify the role of automatic stabilization.
6For the reweighting procedure, we follow the approach of Immvervoll et al.
(2006), who have also simulated an increase in unemployment through reweighting
of the sample. Their analysis focuses on changes in absolute and relative poverty
rates after changes in the income distribution and the employment rate. The
reweighting approach is the only feasible option for this scenario as EUROMOD
does not simulate unemployment benefits for all countries (but takes it from the
data).
7Cf. Deville and Särndal (1992) and DiNardo et al. (1996). This approach is equivalent
to estimating probabilities of becoming unemployed (Bell and Blanchflower 2009) and
then selecting the individuals with the highest probabilities when controlling for the
same characteristics in the reweighting estimation (see Herault (2009)). One should
note, however, that this leads to a downward bias of the short-run stabilization as un-
employment benefits depend strongly on unemployment duration and would be higher
for newly unemployed compared to long-term unemployed.
8Note that for the US the value of the stabilization coefficient for the federal income
tax only is below 25% which is in line with the results of (Auerbach and Feenberg
2000).
9Note that we do not account for the Extended Benefits (EB) program in the US
because it does not kick in automatically in all states. The EB program provides an
additional 13 to 20 weeks of unemployment benefits to workers receiving unemploy-
ment insurance in states that meet certain thresholds in terms of their unemployment
rates. This increased duration of unemployment benefits slightly increases the
stabilization coefficient for the US and, thus, reduces the difference to the EU.
10For more detailed descriptions of the structural balance, see (Girouard and
André 2005) for the OECD- and (Fedelino et al. 2009) for the IMF-methodology.
A discussion of this concept can be found in (Blanchard 1993) and (Mohr and
Morris 2007). In short, there are several conceptual difficulties in separating the
cyclical component of fiscal policy from structural movements which requires
strong assumptions on potential output and cyclical elasticities of different fiscal
variables. These methodological problems can lead to sizeable ex-post revisions of
structural balances. Note that the results presented in this section do not change if
we base our analysis on (IMF 2011).
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/411Note that a portion of the U.S. stimulus package was devoted to its states which
all have some form of balanced budget rules. Hence, the purpose of this policy was to
avoid weakening automatic stabilizers at this lower level of government.
12Aaizenman and Jinjarak (2010) define the first measure (fiscal space 1) as the size
of public debt relative to tax revenue and the second one (fiscal space 2) as the size of
government deficit relative to tax revenue.
13Information on net interest payments, debt/GDP ratio and GDP per capita is from
(IMF 2012) and the level of trade openness is taken from (Heston et al. 2006).
14The negative effects of a fiscal expansion for countries with unsustainable fiscal posi-
tions have already been emphasized at an early stage in the recession, see Spilimbergo
et al. (2008).
15In that sense, a fiscal stimulus program can be seen as a positive externality since
potential positive effects are not limited to the country of origin.
16The univariate regression is not shown separately, but available from the authors
upon request.
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